A series of indefensible proposition, all true:
1) The first critique is more aesthetically interesting than the third.
2) The third critique shaped what a lot of philosophers think about art. The first critique shaped how many artists think about, and do, art.
3) Why? The claim that the structure of appearance is an appearance is fun for artists. A disaster for philosophy.
The notion of disinterest is fun for philosophy. A disaster for art.
4) The first critique is part of the early 18th century aesthetic project, where sensation (including dream and imagination) was central, and art just a privileged instance of sensation.
The third critique is an attempt at a ‘philosophy of art,’ and is very 19th century. The requires a stable of idea of art. There is no such thing, so it dissolves into a discussion on this point
5) Early aesthetics is more important right now than the philosophy of art. It deals with design, screens, cognition, decoration, and so on.
6) The third critique is a snooze-fest, other than the parts about biology.
7) Early aesthetics allows art a place (expansively speaking: it starts with poetry; Lacoon is nothing original in this sense) but is compelling because it also allows us, if we wish, to ignore the concept of art.
8) It is also compelling because it allows for aesthetics to sustain its sensuality, or carnality—from Baumgarten to Boyarin?—while also sustaining a link to cognition.